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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating
to oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2004
through November 1, 2005. The cases examined include decisions
of state and federal courts in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
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Gore Oil Co. v. Roosth2 is a deed-construction case holding that the
deed in question was ambiguous and that the Duhig Rule did not apply.
The deed provided in relevant part as follows:
HAVE GRANTED, SOLD AND CONVEYED, and by these
presents do GRANT, SELL AND CONVEY unto the said Grantee
all that certain tract or parcel of land situated in Knox County,
Texas, described as follows ("Property"), to-wit:
Grantor unto himself, his heirs and assigns, reserves free of all liens a
full one-eighth (1/8) non-participating royalty interest in the Prop-
erty subject to any previously conveyed or reserved mineral interest
as may appear of record in Knox County, Texas.
This conveyance is made and accepted subject to all restrictions, res-
ervations, covenants, conditions, rights-of-way and easements now
outstanding and of record, if any, in Knox County, Texas, affecting
the above described property. 3
At the time the grantor delivered the deed, there was an outstanding 1/16
non-participating royalty. Grantor sued the leasehold owners when they
deducted the 1/16 interest from his reserved 1/8. The working interest
owners contended that the granting clause conveyed all of the "Prop-
erty," that the Duhig Rule applied to reduce the 1/8 reserved in the first
"subject to" clause to 1/16, and that the second "subject to" clause made
the reduced grant subject to all other reservations of record.4
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.5 precludes a grantor and his succes-
sors from claiming title in a reserved fractional mineral interest if it
would, in effect, breach the grantor's warranty as to the title and interest
purportedly conveyed to the grantee. Disagreeing with the working-in-
terest owners', the Gore court held that the Duhig Rule did not apply and
that the deed was simply ambiguous.
The court could not reconcile the two "subject to" clauses and found
the conflicting canons of construction not helpful. But for the second
"subject to" clause, the court might have applied Duhig.6 Because the
deed was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence was admissible. The court con-
sidered three things as controlling on the question of intent: the deed, a
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included.
2. 158 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
3. Id. at 598.
4. Id. at 599-600, 600 n.4.
5. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
6. Gore, 158 S.W.3d at 601-02.
1428 [Vol. 59
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law
contemporary affidavit of record favoring the grantor, and various subse-
quent assignments listing the affidavit. The court upheld the judgment
against the working interest owners of over $270,000, plus $80,000 in at-
torneys' fees, but reversed almost $30,000 in prejudgment interest.7
Under the Texas division-order statute,8 prejudgment interest is not re-
coverable if there is reasonable doubt regarding a title dispute. 9
B. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
Freeman v. Stephens Production Co. 10 holds that a reservation in a min-
eral deed is ambiguous and reverses and remands a summary judgment
for trial. The deed in question conveyed:
... all that certain lot, tract or piece or parcel of land lying and being
situated in Hidalgo county, Texas, to-wit:
All of Lot 1, Block 15; Lot 2, Block 15; The West 17.51 acres of Lot
3, Block 15; All of Lot 10, Block 15; All of Lot 9, Block 15; All of
Lot 11, Block 15; All of Lot 12, Block 15; out of the Closner Subdivi-
sion of Porciones 71 and 72, also known as the San Juan Tract, Hi-
dalgo County, Texas; EXCEPT such minerals as Grantor does not
own; AND ALL of Lot No. 288 of the Kelly-Pharr Subdivision of
Porciones 69 and 70, Hidalgo County, Texas; EXCEPT that there is
reserved in Grantor an undivided one-half participating interest in
and to all of the oil, gas or other minerals in or under said tract of
land .... 11
The issue was whether the reserved interest was in all the land con-
veyed, or only in Lot No. 288. The court held that the deed was ambigu-
ous because the reservation in "said tract" was singular and could refer to
just Lot No. 288, but the grant also referred to a single "tract" and then
conveyed multiple tracts. 12 The court also addressed estoppel by deed,
holding that estoppel by deed may be applied against grantors and grant-
ees alike, and although the party against whom estoppel is sought must be
a party or a privy, there is no corresponding requirement for the party
invoking estoppel. 13
C. EXECUTIVE RIGHT
Sauceda v. Kerlin14 considers the executive-right-holder's duty owed to
a non-participating royalty owner. The case involved a complicated fact
pattern bearing on the ownership of Padre Island. Simplified, immedi-
ately after the Mexican land grant to Padre Nicolas Balli in 1829, there
7. Id.
8. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(b) (Vernon 2001).
9. Gore, 158 S.W.3d at 602.
10. 171 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied).
11. Id. at 653.
12. Id. at 654.
13. Id. at 655.
14. 164 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. granted), judgm't vacated
w.r.m., No. 05-0653, 2006 Tex. LEXIS 201 (Tex. Mar. 10, 2006)).
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was a deed and rescission involving Padre Balli's nephew, Juan Jose Balli,
and Santiago Morales. Title to Padre Island, or parts of it, was repeatedly
disputed by lawsuits, principally in 1902, 1923, and 1940. A 1938 motion
for new trial re-opened the 1923 lawsuit. The resolution of the 1940 case
and settlement of the matters raised in the 1938 motion for new trial re-
sulted in the filing of this suit in 1993.
Lawyer Kerlin was a 1936 Harvard graduate working for his uncle at
Sherman & Sterling in New York City. In 1937, his uncle sent him to
Texas to purchase the Juan Jose Balli title to Padre Island from Balli's
heirs and devisees. Kerlin hired Brownsville lawyer F.W. Seabury to help
him acquire the deeds and litigate. Kerlin represented to the Balli heirs
that if he received something through the deeds, each Balli heir would
receive a 1/64 royalty. Kerlin acquired eleven deeds from various Balli
heirs. Seabury drafted the deeds. Each deed reserved a 1/64 non-partici-
pating royalty.15
Seabury handled complicated and protracted litigation for the next six
years. He represented multiple parties with conflicting claims to title, and
he eventually engineered a global settlement that gave 21,000 acres to
Kerlin. During the settlement negotiations and other related litigation,
Kerlin and Seabury relied on the Balli heirs' underlying claim and the
deeds from the Balli heirs to Kerlin for part of Kerlin's claim. The Balli
heirs' claim was subsumed within a group of claims, but a tract of approx-
imately 7,500 acres was repeatedly identified as tied to the claim of the
Balli heirs.' 6
In November 1942, Kerlin, who was then in the Army, came to Texas
on a three-day pass to settle the case. On November 9, at a scheduled
hearing on a motion for new trial, a stipulation was filed that all matters
had been settled (and later all claims were dismissed). On that same day,
Kerlin met with his uncle and with his lawyer, Seabury. Seabury recom-
mended they abandon the Balli claim. Kerlin then executed reconvey-
ance deeds to the Balli heirs, which falsely recited that he had advised the
Balli heirs of the reconveyance. Not only did he not tell the Balli heirs of
the reconveyance deeds, but he also never delivered nor recorded the
deeds. On that same day, Kerlin visited one of the Balli heirs, and in
describing the purpose of his visit, he did not mention the settlement of
the case. A month after the settlement, Seabury promised the defend-
ants' counsel that no deed would be given to the Balli heirs to cloud the
defendants' title and that the Balli interest would "die in Kerlin. '17
In 1946, Seabury died. In 1953 and 1954, Kerlin told the Balli heirs that
he acquired no title under the Balli deeds and that he was unable to es-
tablish the Juan Jose Balli title. In 1961, Kerlin sold the surface of the
land he acquired for $3,412,500. Over time, various payments were made
to Kerlin for delay rentals and bonuses, but it is not clear from the opin-
15. Id. at 903-05.
16. Id. at 905-07.
17. Id. at 907-08.
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ion whether there was ever any production.' 8
The jury found that Kerlin acquired 7,500 acres for the benefit of the
Balli heirs; that he breached his fiduciary duty to the Balli heirs with re-
spect to the royalty interest reserved in the eleven deeds; that Kerlin and
Seabury conspired and committed fraud; that Seabury breached his fidu-
ciary duty in the settlement; and that Kerlin was estopped to deny the
Balli deeds' validity. 19
On appeal, the court first considered the statute of limitations issue.
The Balli heirs argued that they avoided limitations by pleading fraudu-
lent concealment and statutory tolling. Kerlin, on the other hand, argued
that this was inapplicable because the settlement was a matter of public
record. Thus, the Balli heirs had constructive notice. Kerlin also argued
that the elements of "inherently undiscoverable" and "objectively verifia-
ble," which are necessary to invoke the discovery rule, should apply.20
The court unequivocably rejected this attempt to limit the role of fraudu-
lent concealment in tolling limitations, and found that the Balli heirs had
preserved their claim.2 1
The court also found that there was also a tolling under the statute
which provides, "The absence from this state of a person against whom a
cause of action may be maintained suspends the running of the applicable
statute of limitations for the period of the person's absence. ' 22 Although
this statute generally does not apply to nonresidents, it applies to a non-
resident who was present in the state when the obligation arose.2 3 The
evidence showed that Kerlin was in Texas on his three-day pass when he
settled the case, so the obligation arose.
Although the case is complicated by the other breaches of fiduciary
duty, one section of the opinion clearly focuses on the breach of fiduciary
duty imposed on the holder of the executive right. The court recognized
that "Texas courts generally have applied a standard of 'utmost good
faith' to one who exercises executive rights to lease or develop miner-
als."'24 But it concluded that under Manges v. Guerra2 5 the Texas Su-
preme Court created a fiduciary duty between executive and non-
executive interest owners in mineral deeds, if the executive executes an
oil and gas lease. 26 "[T]hat duty requires the holder of the executive right
to acquire for the non-executive every benefit that he exacts for him-
self."'2 7 Because Kerlin attempted to eliminate or circumvent the Balli
18. Id. at 908-09, 927.
19. Id. at 909.
20. Id. at 917-18 (citing HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex.
1998) for the principles behind the discovery rule).
21. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 918.
22. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.063 (Vernon 1997).
23. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 914, 918.
24. Id. at 916.
25. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
26. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 916.
27. Id. (quoting Manges, 673 S.W.2d at 183-84).
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heirs' royalty interests, he breached his fiduciary duty.28 This supported
an accounting, profit disgorgement, and a constructive trust as
remedies.29
D. WARRANTY
Geodyne Energy Income Production Partnership I-E v. Newton Corp.30
analyzes the effect of a quitclaim deed in the context of alleged violations
of the Texas Security Act ("TSA"). 31 The TSA gives buyers an affirma-
tive defense against misrepresentations known to the seller which could
not reasonably have been discovered by the buyer, and renders void any
contractual provision requiring a buyer to waive compliance with the
TSA. In Geodyne, a buyer purchased a fractional interest in an offshore
lease at auction through the Oil and Gas Asset Clearinghouse-the larg-
est U.S. mineral-interest auction.32 Shortly after the purchase, the buyer
was billed by the operator for the buyer's proportionate part of the plug-
ging cost of the last well on the lease, which had already terminated. The
lower courts rescinded the auction sale based on the TSA and assessed
the abandonment costs against the seller.33 Because the TSA was largely
untested in the courts, and because of the large number of transactions
regularly concluded through the auction process, the case attracted a lot
of interest.
The Texas Supreme Court refused to directly consider the various is-
sues under the TSA because it held that the quitclaim deed was disposi-
tive of the issues in the case. 34 The only misrepresentation alleged was
that the seller represented in the auction catalog that it was selling a ten-
percent interest in a valid lease. There was no other evidence of
misrepresentation. 35
The Assignment and Bill of Sale used by the parties identified the
lease, without stating the nature or percentage interest that was being
conveyed. Seller conveyed to buyer:
... "all of [Geodyne's] right, title, and interest" in the described
lease "AS IS, AND WHERE IS, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY," (2) provided that "this Assignment
hereby conveys to Assignee ... all of Assignor's right, title, and in-
terest on the effective date hereof in and to the Property," and
(3) concluded in the habendum clause that the assignment was
"WITHOUT WARRANTY OF TITLE, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED." 36
28. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 916.
29. Id. at 926-27.
30. 161 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. 2005).
31. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 § (A)(2) (Vernon 2001).
32. Geodyne, 161 S.W.3d at 490.
33. Id. at 484.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 486.
36. Id. at 487.
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The court held that this was a quitclaim deed as a matter of law. A war-
ranty deed conveys property, while a quitclaim deed conveys the gran-
tor's rights in that property, if any. "In deciding whether an instrument is
a quitclaim deed, courts look to whether the language of the instrument,
taken as a whole, conveyed property itself or merely the grantor's
rights."'37
A quitclaim deed is commonly used to convey "interests of an un-
known extent or claims having a dubious basis," and thus "a quitclaim
deed without warranty of title cannot be a warranty (or 'misrepresenta-
tion') of title."' 38 The court found that quitclaim deeds served many use-
ful purposes, and that the TSA should not be construed to outlaw
quitclaim deeds by indirectly requiring a warranty.39 Although the case
did not clarify the TSA, it is significant because the court so strongly and
carefully adhered to the established and fundamental concepts behind the
use of a quitclaim deed. There was no evidence of actual fraud, and in
using a quitclaim deed under these circumstances, the seller clearly in-
tended to transfer all of his rights in the property and whatever risk might
exist as to the scope and extent of those rights. The evidence also estab-
lished that the buyer knew that a plugging liability was implicit in every
lease transfer, and the transfer of the plugging liability was made explicit
in the assignment, 40 so the transfer of this liability was no surprise. An-
other case involving unusual or concealed facts or liabilities might pro-
duce a different result. But in Geodyne, the buyer got exactly what he
paid for-it just turned out to be a bad bargain.
E. EASEMENTS
Trenolone v. Cook Exploration Co.41 examined the rights of the surface
owner and the mineral lessee in an abandoned pipeline. In 1961, Cities
Service acquired a pipeline right-of-way easement under what eventually
became Trenolone's residential neighborhood. The easement provided:
This right-of-way agreement may be assigned by GRANTEE, its suc-
cessors and assigns, in whole or in part, vesting in any other person,
firm or corporation any or all rights granted hereby, including the
ownership of any facilities in place, together with full rights of in-
gress and egress for the maintenance, repair, operation, replacement
and removal thereof.42
Trident N.G.L. Inc., successor-in-interest to Cities Service, removed por-
tions of the pipeline, capped the rest, and released the right-of-way in
1993. 43 Cook, as the lessee under oil and gas leases covering the same
land, claimed the right to transport gas through the pipeline. Trenolone,
37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 487 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 489.
40. Id. at 486, 490.
41. 166 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
42. Id. at 499.
43. Id. at 500.
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the surface owner, disputed Cook's right to use the pipeline, ownership of
the easement, and ownership of the pipeline.44
Cook asserted that, as the mineral lessee and thus, the owner of the
dominant estate, it had the right to use so much of the land, both surface
and subsurface, as was reasonably necessary to enjoy the terms of the
lease, unless there was an express limitation. The court agreed, but noted
that the question of whether the lease's grant of the dominant estate car-
ries the right to use a particular easement is a fact question. The court
explained that the surface owner has the burden of proof, but the surface
owner may show that the lessee's use of the surface is not reasonably
necessary. However, the court did not determine whether or not this par-
ticular use was reasonably necessary; rather, the court held that fact ques-
tions existed, reversed the trial court's summary judgment for Cook, and
remanded the case to the trial court.45
Presumably, the court was focused more on whether Cook could use
this particular right-of-way and pipeline, rather than on the broad ques-
tion of whether the lessee could use a pipeline to transport gas. To do
this, the court first had to determine whether the pipeline was real or
personal property. Whether personal property (a pipeline in this case)
has become part of the realty is dependent on the intent of the parties
that placed the property in the soil, which is a fact question. However,
the issue in this case was determined as a matter of law because of the
undisputed evidence represented by the terms of the easement itself. Cit-
ies Service had the right to remove the pipeline; therefore, it could not
become a permanent accession to the freehold. Moreover, Trident actu-
ally did remove part of it. Therefore, the pipeline was conclusively
personalty.46
The court next had to determine who had title to the personal property.
Title to abandoned personal property vests in the first person who law-
fully reduces it to possession. In this case, Cook started using the pipeline
to transport gas in 1991; Trident formally released the right-of-way in
1993; and Cook continued using it after 1993. There was evidence that
Trident informally abandoned the pipeline before Cook started using it in
1991. However, the court held that the finders-keepers rule on aban-
doned property is that a person must reduce the property to lawful pos-
session after it has been abandoned, which was a fact question in this
case.
47
Trenolone claimed that Trident's release of the right-of-way "to the
property owners" in 1993 evidenced Trident's intent that ownership of
the pipeline and the easement be in the surface owners. The court held
that the issue was not Trident's intent, but rather the intent of the parties
to the original pipeline assignment. Based on the assignment, the court
44. Id. at 497.
45. Id. at 498-99.
46. Id. at 499-500.
47. Id. at 501.
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held that when released, the easement reverted to the surface owner, but
the land was still subject to the mineral owner's reasonable use. How-
ever, ownership of the easement did not resolve ownership of the pipe-
line, because the pipeline is personalty and does not necessarily follow
ownership of the easement. 48 Therefore, the court remanded for a deter-
mination of the timing of the abandonment, the beginning of Cook's use,
and the reasonableness of that usage.49
III. LEASE AND LEASING
A. POOLING CLAUSE
Union Gas Corp. v. Gisler5° was the first of seven related cases consid-
ering the relationship between the lease pooling clause, the filing of the
designation of unit, and the effect on the royalty obligation when the
lessee files after the date of first production. A review of the opinions
issued by the court of appeals is important in analyzing the resolution of
the issues which finally reached the Texas Supreme Court.
The Gisler lease pooling clause read as follows:
Lessee shall file for record in the appropriate records of the county
in which the leased premises are situated an instrument describing
and designating the pooled acreage as a pooled unit; and upon such
recordation the unit shall be effective as to all parties hereto, their
heirs, successors, and assigns irrespective of whether or not the unit
is likewise effective as to all other owners of surface, mineral, royalty
or other rights in land included in such unit.51
The Gisler lease was the well-site tract. Production was obtained on
March 27, 2000, and the designation of unit was filed on August 7, 2000.
In the designation of unit, Union stated that the designation would be
effective from the date of first production. On August 30, 2000, Gisler
sued Union for all royalties from the date of first production until August
7, the date the designation of unit was filed for record. (Gisler also sued
for bad-faith pooling, drainage, breach of implied covenants, fraud, negli-
gence, and conversion, inter alia, against Union.). Union brought all of
the other lessors of the pooled leases into the suit, and the other lessors
contended that they were entitled to share proportionately in all royalties
from the date of first production.5 2 Union paid no royalties to anyone,
and after the suit had been on file for nine months (fourteen months after
the date of first production), the competing lessors began filing motions
for summary judgment. Union then belatedly interpled royalties of
$1,313,327.38, attributable to the time before August 7.53
48. Id. at 500.
49. Id. at 501-02.
50. 129 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
51. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 148.
53. Id. at 152-53.
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The lessors won their separate royalty claims on summary judgment,
the other contract and tort claims were severed, and multiple appeals re-
sulted. In the Gisler appeal on the well-site tract, the Gislers' claims for
past-due royalties had been severed from their other claims, resulting in a
final judgment against Union for an amount equal to the interpled funds,
plus interest and attorney's fees in the amount of $250,000.5 4 The princi-
pal issue in the court of appeals was whether Gisler was entitled to 100%
of royalties to the date of recordation of the unit designation. The court
found no reason to depart from the settled principles expressed in
Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke.55 The lessee's authority to pool is derived
solely from the terms of the lease, and the parties must strictly comply
with the terms of the lease. The lease provided that pooling was effective
upon "recordation," and therefore, there was no pooling until
recordation. 56
The court next considered Union's "double" royalty obligation. Six
other lessors under pooled leases with functionally identical pooling
clauses also sought royalty payments from the date of first production by
summary judgment. Those lessors also prevailed on their claim in the
trial court, thus "doubling" Union's royalty obligation. Union contended
that the Gisler summary judgment and the summary judgments on the six
other motions were facially contradictory. The court of appeals in Gisler
held that, absent express authority, a lessee has no power to pool the
lessor's interests with the interests of others. Union did not pool Gisler in
accordance with the terms of the Gisler lease, so nothing Union did in the
subsequent, unilateral, designation of unit could change Union's obliga-
tion to Gisler. The judgments as to the other royalty owners were not
part of the Gisler appeal.57
Union argued that it should escape further liability because of its filing
in interpleader. The court of appeals refused to release Union because of
Union's unreasonable delay in filing, because Union itself created the
predicament, and because Union did not pay Gisler for production before
August 7.58
Finally, the court of appeals rejected Union's argument that the trial
court should not have severed Gisler's other claims for bad-faith pooling
that could result in either the unit's invalidation or the unit's reformation,
which would obviously affect the royalty rights of others before and after
August 7.59 The court of appeals found that Gisler's contract claim for
royalty was distinguishable from the tort claims, and the other royalty
owners had no tort claims, only their own contract claims.60 In finding
the multiple claims were separable and distinct, the court relied heavily
54. Id. at 149.
55. 38 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
56. Union Gas Corp., 129 S.W.3d at 950-51.
57. Id. at 151-52.
58. Id. at 153-54.
59. Id. at 156.
60. Id. at 155.
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upon Gisler's lease, which expressly provided that the contractual obliga-
tions were independent and "irrespective of whether or not the unit is
likewise effective as to all other owners ... included in such unit."'61 In
finding that the severance was proper, the court may have been influ-
enced by the fact that the court already knew what it was going to do with
the pre-August 7 severed claims of the other lessors.
Union Gas Corp. v. Tittizer62 was the second of the seven cases before
the court of appeals. The trial court granted Tittizer's motion to share
pro rata in royalty prior to August 7, thus effectively "doubling" Union's
royalty obligation, because Gisler was entitled to all royalty before Au-
gust 7. The court of appeals reversed this judgment and held that because
the unit was not effectively pooled under Gisler's lease until the recorda-
tion of the designation, there was no unit production until that time. Al-
though there was production on the Gisler's lease from March 27, there
was no producing well on the pooled unit until August 7.63 Thus, the
court of appeals held that the well-site lease was determinative in resolv-
ing the date by which a leasehold well becomes a unit well.
The court of appeals clearly rejected the trial court's approach of read-
ing each lease in a vacuum, stating, "We are also constrained to construe
all of the leases, Union's late recorded unit designation, and the interplay
of these instruments .... 64 The court continued, "We also agree with
Union that the legal construction of the various leases and unit designa-
tion should be consistent. '65
Union Gas Corp. v. Dornburg,66 the third case considered by the court
of appeals, reached the same result. The Dornburg lease contained a rec-
ordation requirement and only slightly different language than the
clauses found in the Gisler lease and the Tittizer lease. Union Gas Corp.
v. Arnold,67 Union Gas Corp. v. Mission Valley Cemetery Society,68
Union Gas Corp. v. Mission Valley Volunteer Fire Department,69 and
Union Gas Corp. v. Zion Lutheran Church of Mission Valley,70 were
indistinguishable.
Only the Tittizer case was reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court. Tit-
61. Id. at 150.
62. 171 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003), rev'd in part and afj"d in part,
171 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2005).
63. Id. at 214.
64. Id. at 213.
65. Id. at 214.
66. No. 13-01-736-CV, 2003 WL 22478716 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
67. No. 13-01-737-CV, 2003 WL 22478745 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
68. No. 13-01-738-CV, 2003 WL 22478757 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
69. No. 13-010-739-CV, 2003 WL 22478780 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003,
no pet.) (mer. op.).
70. No. 13-01-740-CV, 2003 WL 22478927 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Oct. 30, 2003,
no pet.) (mer. op.).
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tizer v. Union Gas Corp.71 affirmed on the issues and reversed and re-
manded on attorneys' fees. It affirmed that Tittizer was not entitled to
royalties before the unit designation was filed, but apparently on more
limited grounds.72 Although the court of appeals had clearly considered
the moment of pooling as to the Gisler well-site lease to be determina-
tive, in a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court focused not on
the Gisler well-site lease, but on the Tittizer lease. The court quoted the
pooling clause from the Tittizer lease, not the Gisler lease, and cited es-
tablished authority for the proposition that a pooled unit is not formed
under a pooling clause requiring recordation until there is recordation.
The court said:
We hold that this lease does not authorize the lessee to execute a
pooling designation with a retroactive effect. The lease provides that
unitization can be effective only upon recordation. We affirm the
court of appeals' conclusion that the effective date of the pooled unit
was the date of recordation of the Designation, and that Tittizer is
only entitled to her pro rate share of the royalties earned after that
date. 73
Because both the Gisler and Tittizer leases required recordation and
were designated of record at the same time, the result in this case is the
same. However, should those facts change in a future case, the opinion of
the Texas Supreme Court will not be as helpful as the court of appeals
opinion, which recognized that until the well-site lease is pooled, there is
no unit well. For example, severed claims in the Gisler case that were left
pending in the trial court could invalidate the unit as to the Gisler well-
site tract.74 If so, under the court of appeals reasoning, there is no unit
well ever, and the non-drillsite lessors would never share in production.
But it is not clear if the Texas Supreme Court would necessarily find its
Tittizer opinion to be controlling and reach the same result.
B. FREE GAS CLAUSE
EOG Resources, Inc. v. Wall75 considers a "free gas to Lessor" clause
that provided:
Lessor shall have the privilege at his risk and expense of using gas
from any gas well on said land for domestic use in the principal
dwelling thereon out of any surplus gas not needed for operations
hereunder.76
The operator, EOG, sued Walls and others for conversion or alterna-
tively, for taking gas in violation of the contractual provisions of the
lease. The court relied on existing precedent holding that (1) the benefit
71. 171 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2005).
72. Id. at 863.
73. Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
74. Union Gas Corp., 129 S.W.3d at 154.
75. 160 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, no pet. h.).
76. Id. at 132.
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created by a free gas clause is a covenant running with the surface estate,
(2) the surface estate receives the benefits, (3) the mineral estate has the
burden, and (4) if the free gas clause is limited to the "principal dwell-
ing," then the burden to the mineral estate cannot extend to additional
dwellings without the consent of lessee. 77
The case was tried by summary judgment and was reversed and re-
manded because there were fact issues regarding whether the Walls actu-
ally lived on the lease, whether their home was the "principal" dwelling,
and whether the gas was "surplus gas." Specifically, the court held that
there can be only one "principal" dwelling. 78 Additionally, although the
right to free gas under an oil and gas lease is an interest in real property
that can be acquired or lost by adverse possession under the statute of
limitations, the court rejected Walls' affirmative defense of title by ad-
verse possession. The statute requires a claimant relying on the twenty-
five-year statute of limitations for adverse possession to come forward
with a deed that purports to convey title to the property in question. In
this case, the only "deed" in evidence was the oil and gas lease, and the
conveyance of the gas by that lease was in controversy. 79
C. SURFACE DAMAGES
Mieth v. Ranchquest, Inc. 80 considers the proper measure of surface
damages resulting from re-entry operations on an abandoned oil and gas
well. The discharge of saltwater and various drilling fluids and chemicals
damaged the surface, 81 and the Railroad Commission found numerous
violations of Statewide Rule 8.82 The jury found that the reasonable and
necessary cost to remediate the surface was $200,000, but the diminution
in the fair market value was $0. The trial court concluded that the injury
to the property was permanent and, therefore, the correct measure of
damages was the jury's verdict of $0.
The issues on appeal were whether the property damages were perma-
nent or temporary and the proper measure of damages. Permanent dam-
age results from activity that is of such a character and exists under such
circumstances that it will be presumed to continue indefinitely; it is con-
stant and continuous, not intermittent or recurrent. "The proper measure
of damages for permanent injury to the land is the diminution in the
value of the land. ' 83
77. Id. at 137 (citing Thomas v. Thomas, 767 S.W.2d 507, 509-10 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1989, writ denied)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 138 (construing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.028 (Vernon
2002)).
80. 177 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
81. Id. at 301.
82. Id. at 300-01; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (2004) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Water
Protection).
83. Mieth, 177 S.W.3d at 303.
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The distinction between permanent and temporary damage and the
measure of damages was described as follows:
Temporary injuries are intermittent, sporadic, or recurrent injuries to
land that are contingent upon some irregular force, such as rain ....
When an injury to land is temporary and can be remediated at rea-
sonable expense, the proper measure of damages is the cost of resto-
ration to its condition immediately preceding the injury ....
However, the diminution in fair market value is the measure of dam-
ages when the cost of restoration exceeds the diminution in fair mar-
ket value.84
Because the evidence showed that the land's productivity had been im-
paired since 1996, the court held that the damage was permanent and that
the landowners should take nothing.85
D. SUBSURFACE TRESPASS
Mission Resources, Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust86 imposed $10 million in
punitive damages for subsurface trespass, bad-faith pooling, and breach
of the implied covenants to develop and to protect against drainage. The
case arose in south Texas where Mission Resources ("Coastal") operated
two tracts-Share 12, in which it owned 100%, and Share 13, in which it
owned 84%. Coastal conducted a large frac job on Share 12, but Coastal
was slow in pursuing additional development on Share 13. The jury de-
cided almost all questions against Coastal, and the court affirmed on all
issues, except a minor point on attorneys' fees.87
This is the first Texas case to hold an operator liable for subsurface
trespass by hydraulic fracture stimulation treatment of a well. Some evi-
dence contradicted whether the trespass actually occurred and the extent
of the drainage, but there was sufficient evidence for the court to affirm
the jury's verdict. On the legal issue of subsurface trespass, the court
acknowledged that Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co.,88 which
appeared to hold that fracing could not be a trespass, could not be recon-
ciled with the Mission court's reading of the Texas Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Co.89 Thus, the court of appeals
followed Gregg.90 It also ruled that the royalty owners could sue for tres-
pass, even though their ownership was only a non-possessory interest.91
The jury awarded $1 million for subsurface trespass, which the trial
court reduced to $543,776.92 This tort claim was the basis for $10 million
84. Id. at 303-04.
85. Id.
86. 166 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed).
87. Id. at 309-10, 313.
88. 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991), writ denied, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.
1992) (per curiam).
89. 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
90. Mission, 166 S.W.3d at 310-11.
91. Id. at 311-12.
92. Id. at 310.
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in punitive damages. To support a verdict of malice, the landowners had
to prove by clear and convincing evidence either that Coastal specifically
intended to cause substantial injury or harm, or that Coastal's acts or
omissions involved an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability
and magnitude of the potential harm to others.93 The evidence of specific
intent to cause substantial injury was, in this case, essentially circumstan-
tial. The most significant facts appeared to be that Coastal owned a
larger interest in Share 12, Coastal's engineers did not really consider the
extent of the fractures relative to the lease lines, and it was a really large
frac. 94 The court found that this was sufficient evidence of specific intent.
Because the court found specific intent, it did not rule on gross
negligence.
The statutory cap on punitive damages of twice economic damages
would have limited punitive damages to $1,087,532. 95 However, the land-
owners secured a favorable finding on felony theft, which made the cap
inapplicable. The finding of felony theft required landowners to prove
that Coastal intended to and did unlawfully deprive them of their prop-
erty in an amount in excess of $20,000.96 There was sufficient evidence to
show that the amount in this case exceeded $20,000. The court was satis-
fied with very limited evidence to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt"
Coastal's specific intent to deprive landowners of their property. 97
Coastal attacked the punitive damages by arguing that the contract
claim (for breach of the covenant to protect against drainage) and the
tort claim (for trespass) complained of essentially the same conduct-a
contract complaint, which would not support punitives. The court dis-
agreed, but did not articulate its reasoning in concluding that the cause of
action was a tort, other than to say that it could have been either, and that
there was a jury finding on trespass.98
Coastal also challenged the measure of damages in the failure-to-de-
velop charge. Coastal contended that the proper "measure of damages
for the failure to develop [was] the difference between the royalty that
was actually paid and the royalty that should have been paid had the
lessee exercised ordinary care to develop the lease (the 'royalty rule')."99
This court held that the proper measure of damages was the value of the
interest income on the royalty that the landowners lost, if any, through
the lessee's failure to reasonably develop the lease. 1°°
93. Id. at 313 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(7) (Vernon Supp.
2004-05)).
94. Id. at 313-15.
95. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b), (c)(13) (Vernon Supp.
2005).
96. Mission, 166 S.W.3d at 315 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)-(7)
(Vernon Supp. 2004-05)).
97. Id. at 315-16.
98. Id. at 317.
99. Id. at 320 (citing Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031,
1038 (1928)).
100. Id. at 320-21.
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IV. OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND OPERATIONS
A. UNIFORM MAINTENANCE OF INTEREST CLAUSE
ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.10 1 held the operator liable
for substantial damages for breach of the uniform maintenance of interest
("MOI") provision of the parties' joint operating agreement ("JOA").
The MOI provision was the typical form JOA provision found in Arti-
cle VIII.B. of the JOA, except that it deleted the references to "uniform."
It provided:
E. Maintenance of Uniform Interest:
For the purpose of maintaining uniformity of ownership in thea oil
and gas leasehold inte.rests covered by this agreement, and Notwith-
standing any other provisions to the contrary, no party shall sell, en-
cumber, transfer or make other disposition of its interest in the
leases embraced within the Contract Area and in wells, equipment
and production unless such disposition covers either:
1. the entire interest of the party in all leases and equipment and
production; or
2. an equal undivided interest in all leases and equipment and pro-
duction in the Contract Area. Every such sale encumbrance, trans-
fer or other disposition made by any party shall be made expressly
subject to this agreement, and shall be made without prejudice to the
rights of the other parties. 10 2
Three producing wells were drilled through the higher Cotton Valley
Sand formation in Unit 16 and into the lower Cotton Valley Lime, but it
was known that there were behind-the-pipe reserves in the higher Cotton
Valley Sand. The majority owner and operator, ExxonMobil, then
farmed out the higher Cotton Valley Sand formation to farmees, who
proposed and drilled five wells. Not knowing that the farmees had any
relationship with Unit 16, Valence made no response to the first two well
proposals from the farmees. Failure to respond under the JOA is deemed
to be an election to go non-consent. Valence participated in the last three
wells proposed by the farmees "under protest." Valence sued Exx-
onMobil to recover the non-consent penalties, the additional costs in-
curred to drill and complete new wells in the Cotton Valley Sand (rather
than produce the zone through the existing wells), and for attorneys'
fees. 10 3 Valence recovered $523,432 for the non-consent penalties,
$310,867 for the extra costs, and $166,250 in attorneys' fees, together with
prejudgment interest, in a judgment that was affirmed. 10 4
On appeal, the court rejected ExxonMobil's argument that the deletion
of the reference to "uniform" indicated an intention not to require the
maintenance of uniform interests. The court reasoned that the deletion
merely recognized the reality that ExxonMobil owned 81.8% and Va-
101. 174 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
102. Id. at 311 (strikeouts in original).
103. Id. at 307-08.
104. Id. at 307, 315, 319-20.
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lence owned 18.2%, which was not "uniform." The whole MOI provision
would be meaningless if the provision was not intended to maintain the
parties' respective interests in the lease. 10 5 The court also rejected Exx-
onMobil's argument that the MOI provision did not apply because it was
only applicable to transfers of its "interest in the leases embraced within
the Contract Area and in wells .... "106 That is, ExxonMobil argued that
it did not transfer any interest in wells; therefore, the MOI provision was
inapplicable. The court responded that "When ExxonMobil transferred
its entire interest in land in the Cotton Valley Sand portion of the Unit 16
oil and gas lease, it executed a conveyance of realty that transferred its
interest in wells, equipment, and production appertaining to the Cotton
Valley Sand formation. '10 7 This conclusion was based on the language in
the farmout, which provided that ExxonMobil agreed to convey "all of
[its] present right, title and interest (herein referred to as 'interests in
land') in a segregated portion of Unit 16 .... 108
To prove damages for the extra expense incurred in drilling the new
wells, Valence showed the cost difference between the new well costs and
the existing wells' theoretical dual completion costs. The judgment
awarded Valance $310,867, which was the difference (for the three ex-
isting Cotton Valley Lime wells) multiplied by Valence's 18.2% interest.
The court affirmed this judgment as consequential damages for breach of
contract. By farming out and retaining an overriding royalty, Exx-
onMobil relieved itself of the costs of exploiting the gas in the Cotton
Valley Sand formation while creating farmees who had no interest in min-
imizing the number of wells or in using existing wellbores. By severing its
interest from Valence's, rather than maintaining it, ExxonMobil breached
the JOA and caused Valence to incur the extra costs. 10 9
The issue on non-consent penalties was limited to the first two wells
and Valence's failure to elect to participate.
Valence acknowledges that its non-consent damages were limited to
the two wells in which it did not participate (16-4 and 16-5), multi-
plied by its 18.2% interest times the actual cost of drilling a well,
multiplied by 200% (the 300% penalty minus 100% of the actual cost
of drilling). 110
The court affirmed the judgment of $523,432 against ExxonMobil be-
cause the failure to consent cannot result in any contractual penalties un-
less it is triggered by the required notice of operations. ExxonMobil gave
no notice, and it was not enough that the farmees gave notice of their
proposal to drill new wells into the Cotton Valley Sand formation.
105. Id. at 311-12.
106. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 314.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 316.
110. Id. at 318.
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Such "notice" from strangers to the JOA, coming after the farmout
agreement had already been executed, entirely failed to satisfy the
purpose of the notice requirement, namely, that Valence be given the
opportunity to consent, or not, to a proposal made by a party to the
JOA who had agreed to all its terms and conditions-not by stran-
gers to the JOA with different interests.1 1 '
B. SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS CLAUSE
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett"2 construes the notice and noncon-
sent provisions applicable to subsequent operations under the A.A.P.L.
Form 610-1977 Model Form Operating Agreement ("JOA"), as primarily
determined by the notice provision found in Article VI.B.(1) of the JOA.
The JOA provides that the operator "shall, within sixty (60) days after the
expiration of the notice period of thirty (30) days... actually commence
work on the proposed operation and complete it with due diligence."" 3
The notice is given to other owners so that they may elect to consent to
subsequent operations or elect to go non-consent. 114 In this case, the
court held that the JOA permits the operator to commence work before
the expiration of the thirty-day notice period required for subsequent
operations.
Valence, as operator, proposed drilling a series of wells over time under
various notices, none of which gave thirty-days notice prior to the com-
mencement of operations. Dorsett argued that the non-consent provi-
sions were inapplicable because Valence failed to give notice thirty days
prior to the commencement of operations as required by the JOA; there-
fore, Dorsett should recover the leasehold interests lost over ten years.
Valence argued that the operator could commence operations at any
time, and that Article VI.B.(1) requires only that the operator allow the
non-operator thirty days to elect to participate, regardless of the timing of
the commencement of operations."15
The court agreed with Valence that "the provision's purpose is not to
prohibit the early commencement of work, but to ensure that work is not
unreasonably delayed after the consent deadline. 1" 6 The court based its
opinion on the JOA's plain language and the conclusion that early com-
mencement could be beneficial (for instance, by offsetting a draining
well) and that the entire risk of early commencement falls on the opera-
tor, with no apparent consequences to the other working-interest
owners.117
Dorsett also claimed that the non-consent provisions were an unen-
forceable liquidated damages provision. The court, however, construed
111. Id.
112. 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005).
113. Id. at 661 (citing A.A.P.L. Form 610-1977 art. VI.B.2. (1977)).
114. Id. at 662-63.
115. Id. at 658-61.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 662-63.
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the non-consent provisions as a reward to the consenting parties for un-
dertaking a defined risk, rather than a liquidated damages clause. 118 The
court expressly disapproved prior authority treating the non-consent pen-
alty as a liquidated damages provision." 9 The court reasoned that to
construe the provision otherwise would mean that no one would consent,
because there would be no incentive to do so. 120 The concurring opinion
also noted that the "non-consent penalty is industry vernacular" and does
not appear in the JOA, but "those in the oil industry widely use and rely
on clauses like the one here, and certainly consider them enforceable."'' 2 1
C. REMOVAL-OF-OPERATOR AND PREFERENTIAL
RIGHT-TO-PURCHASE CLAUSES
Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd.122 addresses
disputes involving a preferential right to purchase provision and a re-
moval of operator provision. Occidental or its affiliates ("OXY") were
the operator and seller of a 75% interest in the Midland Farms Unit
("MFU") in which Fasken and others owned the minority interest. The
packaged sale of assets was valued at approximately $3.55 billion, and the
parties allocated $63 million as the purchase price of OXY's interest in
the MFU. Fasken disputed the adequacy of OXY's notice in connection
with the preferential right and contended that OXY had been removed as
operator by a vote of the minority owners. 123 The court held the notice
was adequate, and although OXY was voted out as operator, OXY con-
tinued as operator because no successor was elected. 124
With regard to notice, the preferential right clause required the seller
to give a written notice "with full information concerning its proposed
sale, assignment, transfer of ownership or transfer of control of owner-
ship; or other disposition, which notice shall include .... ,,l25 The clause
enumerated four specific information categories. One category required
disclosure of "the purchase price or in the event of the transfer of a...
group of properties, an allocation of that portion of the purchase price
attributable to its interest in the oil and gas estate under this Agreement
or in the Unit Area .... ,,a26 Although there was a protracted dispute
over the purchase-price allocation and how that may have affected the
notice's validity, the court held that the contractual preferential right did
not require that the basis of the allocation be in the written notice.127
118. Id. at 664 (citing Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560,
565 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)).
119. Id. (disapproving Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
120. Id. at 665.
121. Id. at 665-66.
122. No. 08-03-00407-CV, 2005 WL 1539260 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
123. Id. at *1-6.
124. Id. at *1.
125. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Id. at *9.
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Fasken raised other objections as to the notice's adequacy, but the court
held that the "notice given was sufficient to reasonably disclose the pro-
posed transaction and to provide Fasken entities an opportunity to exer-
cise its preferential right to purchase . . .even if there were technical
deficiencies that rendered that notice less than perfect."' 28
With regard to whether OXY was the operator, the operating agree-
ment for the MFU provided that the operator (OXY) could be removed
by a vote of 85% of the voting interest remaining after excluding the
operator's voting interest. Although Fasken and the other minority own-
ers voted OXY out as operator, the operating agreement required that
the owners elect a successor operator by "the affirmative vote of three (3)
or more Working Interest Owners having at least eighty-five percent
(85%) of the combined voting interest of all Working Interest Owners,
provided no Unit Operator who is removed may vote to succeed it-
self."1 29 OXY simply voted "no" to the proposed successor and contin-
ued to operate. The agreement also provided that "[a] Unit Operator
who . . . is removed shall not be released from its obligations hereunder
for a period of three (3) months after its ... discharge unless a successor
Unit Operator shall have taken over the operations hereunder prior to
the expiration of said period."'' 30 The court could have read this provi-
sion to mean that the removed operator is released in three months or
sooner if a successor is selected. Instead, this court held that the operat-
ing agreement did not prohibit OXY from voting "no" in elections to
select a successor operator, and because no successor had been selected,
OXY could continue as operator. 13' Fasken had also sued for damages
based on OXY's continuing to operate, but the jury found that Fasken
was not injured by OXY continuing operations. 132
D. ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
XCO Production Co. v. Jamison133 holds that a joint operating agree-
ment's two-year contractual limitations period does not apply to disputes
between non-operators. XCO and Jamison entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement, which incorporated the operating agreements for the oil
and gas properties. This Agreement created a tax partnership between
XCO and Jamison; XCO owned non-operated working interests in oil
and gas properties in Louisiana, which it contributed to the partnership,
and Jamison contributed cash. The partners' dispute involved the deduc-
tion of certain costs and the payout calculation.' 34
128. Id. at *10.
129. Id. at *11.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *12-13.
132. Id. at *16 n.20.
133. No. 14-03-01198-CV, 2005 WL 1242289 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2005, no
pet.).
134. Id. at *1-2.
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Among other issues in the case, XCO contended that the two-year con-
tractual limitation on accounting disputes in the operating agreement ap-
plied to the dispute between XCO and Jamison.135 The court disagreed
and held that the "provision clearly applies to accounting procedures be-
tween the operator and the non-operators. ' 136 This dispute was not be-
tween the operator and a non-operator, but rather between two partners
who own a non-operator's interest.137
V. OPERATIONS
A. TEXAS NATIONAL RESOURCES CODE VIOLATIONS
Emerald Oil & Gas, L. C. v. Exxon Corp.138 holds that a private cause
of action exists for damages to the mineral estate if caused by conduct
that violates the Texas Natural Resources Code, and the injured party
may assert a claim for damages, even if it owned no interest in the land
when the statutory violations occurred. Emerald alleged that Exxon in-
tentionally sabotaged wells by improperly plugging and abandoning
them, and that Exxon misrepresented the status of the wells in its Texas
Railroad Commission filings. 139 Emerald relied upon Exxon's filings
when it acquired the properties. The trial court held that Emerald had no
private cause of action for violation of the statutes. The court of appeals
reversed.140
Section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources Code states that:
A party who owns an interest in property or production that may be
damaged by another party violating the provisions of this chapter
that were formerly a part of Chapter 26, Acts of the 42nd Legisla-
ture, 1st Called Session, 1931, as amended, or another law of this
state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order of the commission
may sue for and recover damages and have any other relief to which
he may be entitled at law or in equity. Provided, however, that in
any action brought under this section or otherwise, alleging waste to
have been caused by an act or omission of a lease owner or operator,
it shall be a defense that the lease owner or operator was acting as a
reasonably prudent operator would act under the same or similar
facts and circumstances. 14
The court held that this language was clear and unambiguous in establish-
ing a cause of action and that there were equally clear precedents con-
firming the existence of the private cause of action.' 42
135. Id. at *11.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. No. 13-99-757-CV, 2005 WL 167051 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed).
139. The case was a summary judgment proceeding that dismissed the claim for failure
to state a cause of action. Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, Emerald's pleadings
were accepted as true.
140. Emerald, 2005 WL 167051, at *1.
141. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (Vernon 2001).
142. Emerald, 2005 WL 167051 at *4 (citing HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d
881, 890 (Tex. 1998)).
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The court further held that the statute did not require that Emerald
own the property at the time of the alleged tortious acts. Therefore, Em-
erald could assert these claims, even though Exxon's conduct occurred
before Emerald acquired its interest.143
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
Chi Energy, Inc. v. Urias'" construed the application of statutory limi-
tations on premises liability in a case involving an explosion on an oil well
that resulted in two deaths. Chi Energy, Inc., an exploration and produc-
tion company, owned the leasehold interest in the well, and Chi Operat-
ing, Inc., its affiliated operating company, drilled the well. Chi Operating
and West Texas Roustabout ("WTR") agreed orally on a "turnkey" con-
tract for used tank-battery vessels. At a time when the operator had
closed the site and no one else was on the site, two employees of WTR
used a cutting torch on a used oil tank to remove old fittings. The two
WTR employees were killed in the resulting explosion. The jury awarded
$7,880,272 in actual damages against the operator.145
Various provisions of Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practices and
Remedie Code, a statute originating in the 1996 tort reform package, 146
define "property owner" and the nature of a claim governed by the stat-
ute, and also provide certain limitations on liability. Generally, the stat-
ute applies to negligence claims brought against entities that own real
property for business purposes. 147
When Chapter 95 applies, a property owner will not be liable for
negligence claims arising from the failure to provide a safe work-
place unless: (1) the property owner exercises or retains some con-
trol over the manner in which the work is performed, other than the
right to order the work to start or stop or to inspect progress and
receive reports; and (2) the property owner had actual knowledge of
the danger or condition resulting in the personal injury, death or
property damage and failed to adequately warn. 148
Both statutory requirements-control and knowledge of the danger-
must be met before a landowner is held liable for injuries of an indepen-
dent contractor's employee. Control means more than a general right to
order workers to stop or start, a right to inspect, or right to receive re-
143. Id. at *5. Cf Cook v. Exxon Corp., 145 S.W.3d 776, 782 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2004, no pet.); Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co., 123 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2003, no pet.); Exxon v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 27-28 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied);
Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied) (holding
that subsequent owners have no tort claims for damages to land that occurred before they
acquired their interest).
144. 156 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
145. Id. at 874-77.
146. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95 (Vernon 1997).
147. Chi Energy, 156 S.W.3d at 879.
148. Id. at 878-79 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003(1)-(2) (Vernon
1997)).
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ports.1 49 Knowledge means "actual knowledge of the danger or condi-
tion resulting in the personal injury . . . and fail[ure] to adequately
warn. ' 150 The court in this case reversed and rendered the jury decision
based on no evidence of control or knowledge.
In this case, there was no contractual right of control, usually a ques-
tion of law, and no actual control. The necessary degree of control must
extend to "operative detail" of the contractor's work, which did not occur
because these two roustabouts decided on their own to apply heat to a
tank on a closed site, and the tank itself was not an inherently dangerous
item. 151 "Moreover, there must be a nexus between the control actually
exercised and the resulting injury. '152
C. INSURANCE AND DRILLING CONTRACTS
Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Swift Energy Co. 153
held the operator liable for spill clean-up costs, but it held that the drill-
ing contractor's insurer was not liable to the operator as an additional
insured because the costs did not exceed the deductible. Helmerich &
Payne's ("H&P") insurance named the operator Swift as an additional
insured, but the insurance company refused to pay based on the deducti-
ble. The spill clean-up costs were $155,000, and the deductible was
$750,000.154
The court refused to impose liability on H&P for any alleged breach of
the insurance policy. Paragraph 13 of the drilling contract, which gov-
erned insurance, required H&P to acquire comprehensive general liabil-
ity insurance with pollution coverage, but it did not contain any
requirements regarding the deductible. Because the policy was silent as
to the allocation of deductible as between or among named insureds and
additional insureds, there was no contractual obligation on H&P to pay
Swift the deductible. 155
Swift contended that H&P breached the drilling contract by failing to
pay the deductible because paragraph 13 provided that "[a]ll policies re-
quired . . . shall provide . . . that all deductibles . . .shall be the sole
obligation of [H&P]."'1 56 Although this states that all deductibles shall be
the sole obligation of H&P, the court said that it does not provide that
H&P must reimburse the operator, Swift. It is at best an implied obliga-
tion. However, because the court found that paragraph 14 of the drilling
contract transferred risk to Swift, it did not decide this question. 157
149. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.003(1).
150. § 95.003.
151. Chi Energy, 156 S.W.3d at 880.
152. Id.
153. 180 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. filed).
154. Id. at 640.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 642.
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Under paragraph 14 of the drilling contract, the parties agreed as
follows:
14.11 Pollution and Contamination: Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained herein ....
(b) [Swift] shall assume all responsibility for, including control and
removal of, and shall protect, defend and indemnify [H&P] from and
against all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and
character arising directly or indirectly from all other pollution or
contamination which may occur during the conduct of operations
hereunder. 158
It was uncontested that the spill fell within paragraph 14.11(b). The court
held that under the plain meaning of this paragraph, Swift assumed all
liability for the spill and indemnified H&P. Even if paragraph 13 could
be construed to impose a duty on H&P to reimburse Swift for the costs,
such a construction would be contrary to paragraph 14. "When parties
use the clause 'notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
herein' in a paragraph of their contract, they intend the paragraph to su-
persede all other contract provisions. ' 159
Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Hunt Petroleum (AEC), Inc.160 held
that the International Association of Drilling Contractors' daywork drill-
ing form contract is ambiguous as to the meaning of "highly corrosive or
otherwise destructive elements."' 161 Hunt was "Operator" and Zurich's
insured (Nabors) was the "Contractor." A tropical storm hit and sub-
merged the rig in seawater, causing significant damage. The contractor's
insurance company sued the operator to recover the cost of repairs. 162
The applicable provisions of the form contract provided:
14. Responsibility for loss or damage, indemnity, release of liability
and allocation of risk:
14.1 Contractor's Surface Equipment: Contractor shall assume liabil-
ity at all times for damage to or destruction of Contractor's surface
equipment, regardless of when or how such destruction occurs, and
Contractor shall release Operator of any liability for any such loss,
except loss or damage under the provisions of Paragraph 10 or 14.3.
14.3. Contractor's Equipment-Environmental Loss or Damage:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 14.1 above, Operator
shall assume liability at all times for damage to or destruction of
Contractor's equipment caused by exposure to highly corrosive or
otherwise destructive elements, including those introduced into the
drilling fluid.
158. Id. at 638-39.
159. Id. at 643.
160. 157 S.W. 3d 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
161. Id. at 467.
162. Id. at 463.
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17. Force Majeure:
Neither Operator nor Contractor shall be liable to the other for...
damage . . .caused by . . . action of the elements, water condi-
tions, . . ., or other causes beyond the control of the party affected
thereby .... 163
Hunt claimed that paragraph 17 controls and that paragraph 14.3 does
not because "the commonly understood meaning of paragraph 14.3 ex-
cludes damage caused by salty floodwater, and paragraph 14.3 does not
expressly state that it overrides paragraph 17. ' ' 164 Zurich contended that
paragraph 14.3 states that Hunt is liable "at all times."'1 65 The court con-
cluded that the contract was ambiguous and remanded for trial.
1 66
VI. GAS CONTRACTS AND MARKETING.
Calpine Producer Services, L.P. v. Wiser Oil Co.1 67 held that a reseller
of gas was not obligated to pay the producer when the reseller's customer
failed to pay and filed for bankruptcy protection. Enron, the debtor, was
obligated to pay Calpine, the reseller, $732,906, of which $727,161 was
payable to the producer, Wiser. Enron paid Calpine only a portion of the
claim in the Enron bankruptcy proceeding. Wiser sued Calpine seeking
recovery of the full purchase price based on Calpine's alleged breach of
their Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement. 1 6
The relevant contract provisions stated that the price payable was
equal to the "Net Proceeds (as hereinafter defined) received by Buyer for
gas owned or controlled by Seller and resold by Buyer under the Resale
Contract(s);" "'Net Proceeds' shall mean .. . the difference between
'Gross Proceeds' . . . and 'Authorized Costs' . . . where 'Gross Proceeds'
equal the sum of (a) the gross proceeds received by Buyer for gas owned
or controlled by Seller and resold by Buyer;" and "Buyer shall make pay-
ment.., the date it receives payment from its customers under the Resale
Contract(s) for gas purchased hereunder.' '1 69
The legal issue was whether Enron's payment was a condition prece-
dent to Calpine's obligation to pay Wiser. The court held that payment
by Enron was a condition by the plain meaning of the contract, and it
refused to read into the contract a "specific requirement that where the
third-party purchaser does not pay Calpine, Calpine must pay Wiser for
the gas within a reasonable time of when the third-party should have paid
Calpine."170
163. Id. at 464.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 467.
166. Id.
167. 169 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
168. Id. at 784-86.
169. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).




1. AcT: Act of May 20, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 489, §§ 1-8, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1351 (Vernon). 171 (HB 380)
ISSUE: Relating to oil- and gas-well-plugging insurance policies.
SUMMARY: This act authorizes the Railroad Commission to accept a
well-specific plugging insurance policy that is approved by the Texas De-
partment of Insurance; names the State of Texas as the owner and contin-
gent beneficiary of the policy; names a primary beneficiary who agrees to
plug the specified well bore; is fully prepaid and cannot be cancelled or
surrendered; provides that the policy continues in effect until the speci-
fied well bore is plugged; provides that benefits will be paid when, but not
before, the specified well bore is plugged according to Railroad Commis-
sion rules in effect at the time of plugging; and provides benefits that
equal the greatest of: (1) $2.00 per each foot of well depth; (2) if the
specified well is a bay well that is producing oil or gas, the amount re-
quired under Railroad Commission rules for a bay well that is not pro-
ducing oil or gas; (3) if the specified well is an offshore well that is
producing oil or gas, the amount required under Railroad Commission
rules for an offshore well that is not producing oil or gas; or (4) the pay-
ment otherwise due under the policy for plugging the well bore. This
method of financial assurance can be used in lieu of a bond, letter of
credit, or cash deposit.
To calculate the bond amount that an operator must file, if a well bore
is included in a well-specific plugging insurance policy, then it is excluded.
EFFEcrIVE:June 17, 2005.
2. Acr: Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1001, §§ 1-7, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3370 (Vernon).172 (HB 484)
ISSUE: Relating to the filing of electric logs with the Railroad
Commission.
SUMMARY: This act clarifies the requirement to file an electric log for
any well drilling for any purpose related to exploration, production, or
storage of oil or gas, including injection wells, disposal wells, or brine
mining.
The act requires that an operator file a basic electric log not later than
the ninetieth day after the date a drilling operation is completed. An
operator who fails to timely file a written request that the electric log
remain confidential must file the log with the Railroad Commission im-
mediately after the period for filing such a request ends.
EFFEcTIVE: September 1, 2005.
171. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.104, 91.1041,
91.1042, 91.105, 91.107, 91.108, 91.109, 91.111(c) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
172. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.551(a), 91.551(b),
91.552(a), 91.553, 91.554, 91.556 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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3. ACT: Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1037, §§ 1-2, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3500 (Vernon). 173 (HB 1161)
ISSUE: Relating to the Railroad Commission providing certain infor-
mation to owners of oil- or gas-royalty interests.
SUMMARY: This act allows a royalty interest owner to obtain produc-
tion information that has been reported to the Railroad Commission ei-
ther by (1) contacting the Commission's oil and gas division or by (2)
providing the lease county and identification number on the Commis-
sion's website.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2005.
4. ACT: Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1119, §§ 1-3, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3705 (Vernon).' 74 (HB 2440)
ISSUE: Relating to the Railroad Commission's regulation of activities
associated with multiple accumulations of hydrocarbons, from which pro-
duction by hydrocarbons commingling is authorized.
SUMMARY: This act provides that the Railroad Commission may regu-
late all activities that are under its jurisdiction and associated with com-
mingled, separate multiple, or lenticular accumulations of oil or gas as if
such accumulations were a single common reservoir.
EFFECTIVE: June 18, 2005.
5. ACT: Act of May 28, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 874, §§ 1-3, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2598 (Vernon). 175 (SB 1103)
ISSUE: Relating to the powers and duties of the General Land Office
and the disposition of certain unsurveyed public school land.
SUMMARY: This act applies to the General Land Office Commis-
sioner's determination of whether a vacancy exists and whether to sell or
lease vacant land. It clarifies the procedure for resolving claims to vacant
land and favors adjoining owners or claimants who have used the land
under an assumption of ownership under color of title for at least ten
years.
This act defines a "good-faith claimant" as a person who, on the appli-
cation commencement date, (1) occupies, uses, or has previously occu-
pied or used, or whose predecessors-in-interest have occupied or used the
land or any interest in the land for any purposes, including occupying or
using (a) the surface or mineral estate for any purposes, (b) an easement
or right-of-way, (c) a mineral royalty or leasehold interest; (2) has had, or
whose predecessors-in-interest have had, the land enclosed or within defi-
nite, recognizable boundaries and in possession under a chain of title for
at least ten years with a good-faith belief that the land was within the
boundaries of a survey that was previously titled, awarded, or sold under
173. Codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.504(e) (Vernon
Supp. 2005).
174. Codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.081(b) (Vernon
Supp. 2005).




circumstances that would have vested title in the land if it were actually
located within those boundaries; (3) is the owner of the land that (a) ad-
joins the land claimed to be vacant and (b) for which no vacancy applica-
tion has been filed or (c) holds title under a person described in (1), (2),
or (3) above or is entitled to a distributive share of a title acquired under
an application filed by a person described in (1), (2), or (3) above.
To the definition of "vacancy," this act adds unsurveyed public-school
land that was not, on the application date, subject to a vacancy applica-
tion denied with prejudice or subject to a previous vacancy application
that has been finally adjudicated by the Commissioner or a Texas court or
a United States court.
This act provides a detailed procedure for receiving applications, giving
notice to interested parties, and resolving claims administratively. The
administrative procedure should result in a finding that the land is or is
not vacant in six months or fewer.
This act also provides that a party cannot appeal a final order with a
finding of "Not Vacant Land" because it is conclusive regarding the land
described in the vacancy application or investigated by the Commissioner
as a result of the application. A necessary party may appeal a final order
to the district court where a majority of the vacant land is located not
later than the thirtieth day after the final order's issuance. All necessary
parties must receive notice of such an appeal by the party filing it.
Under this act, a good-faith claimant has the first preferential right to
purchase or lease the claimant's interest in the vacant land. The applicant
has the second preferential right to purchase or lease any interest not
claimed or taken by a good-faith claimant.
If a good-faith claimant exercises his preferential right in the vacant
land, the applicant has a preferential right to either an award of a perpet-
ual 1/32 nonparticipating royalty of the vacancy's full mineral interest or a
preferential right to purchase or lease any remaining interest in the va-
cant land. If a mineral lease exists on the vacant land, the applicant's 1/32
nonparticipating royalty interest shall be taken from the state's royalty
interest for the lease's duration, provided that the applicant's share for
the lease's duration may never equal more than the interest the state
retains.
EFFECrIVE: June 17, 2005.
6. Act: Act of May 27, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 881, §§ 1-8, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2981 (Vernon). 176 (SB 1170)
ISSUE: Relating to the Railroad Commission's regulation of gas
production.
SUMMARY: This act allows, but does not require the Railroad Commis-
sion to determine the status of gas production from any reservoir upon
written complaint by an affected party or on its own initiative.
176. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 86.081, 86.084, 86.085,
86.086, 86.087, 86.089(a), 86.094 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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This act requires the Railroad Commission to prorate and regulate the
daily gas-well production from a common reservoir if it finds it necessary
to prevent waste or adjust the correlative rights and opportunities of each
gas owner in a common reservoir to produce and use or sell the gas.
This act also provides that, after determining demand for and volume
of production from a prorated reservoir, the Commission shall fix the
monthly reservoir allowable to be produced at the lawful market demand
or at the volume that can be produced without waste, whichever is the
smaller quantity. The monthly reservoir allowable shall be allocated
among all wells entitled to produce gas from a prorated reservoir, but
each well is restricted to the amount of gas that can be produced from it
without waste.
EFFECTIVE: June 17, 2005.
7. ACT: Act of May 27, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 346, §§ 1-6, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 992 (Vernon). 177 (SB 1175)
ISSUE: Relating to the Railroad Commission's regulation of oil and gas
production.
SUMMARY: This act provides that if a rule or order of the Commission
limits or fixes oil production in a pool or portion of a pool, or gas produc-
tion from gas wells producing gas only, and the Commission receives a
written complaint from an affected party or on its own initiative, then the
Commission will give notice and a hearing opportunity. After that, the
Commission will distribute, prorate, or otherwise apportion the allowable
production among the various producers on a reasonable basis if it thinks
it is necessary to prevent waste or adjust the correlative rights and oppor-
tunities of each owner in a common reservoir to produce and use or sell
the oil or gas.
This act also allows, but does not require, the Railroad Commission to
allocate the allowable production of oil among the various pools in the
state. The Commission can do this on written complaint and proof of
such discrimination or if, on its own initiative, the Commission deems
such action necessary. It must also be fair and reasonable in order to
prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of one pool over another.
The Commission can also investigate gas-producing wells after an af-
fected party files a complaint or on its own initiative. If, after notice and
an opportunity for a hearing, the Commission finds that full production
from wells producing only gas from a common source is in excess of the
reasonable market demand, the Commission can inquire into the gas's
production and reasonable market demand. The Commission can then
determine the allowable production from the common supply source. Fi-
nally, the Commission can apportion the allowable production from a
prorated common supply source among the various producers on a rea-
sonable basis, and it can limit each producer to the amount allocated.
177. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.043, 85.053(a),
85.054(a) & (c), 85.055(a)-(c), 85.058 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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EFFECTIVE: June 17, 2005.
8. Ac'r: Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1000, §§ 1-3, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3370 (Vernon).178 (HB 474)
ISSUE: Relating to a gas utility's duty to report certain transactions to
the Railroad Commission.
SUMMARY: This act mandates that gas utilities report a sale, acquisi-
tion, or lease of a plant as an operating unit or system. This applies to
transactions for more than $1 million or a merger or consolidation with
another gas utility operating in Texas, and the report must come within
sixty days after the date the transaction took effect, as opposed to within
a "reasonable time," as the previous law stated.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2005.
9. ACT: Act of May 13, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 530, §§ 1-11, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1432 (Vernon). 179 (HB 951)
ISSUE: Relating to certain activities in easements and rights-of-way of
pipeline facilities.
SUMMARY: A person may not build, repair, replace, or maintain a con-
struction on, across, over, or under the easement or right-of-way for a
pipeline facility without notifying the pipeline facility's operator. The
construction can take place if the operator determines that it will not pre-
sent a risk to the public or increase the risk of a break, leak, rupture, or
other damage to the facility. If the operator determines there is a risk to
the public or to the pipeline facility, the constructor must pay the reason-
able, necessary, and documented cost of additional fortifications, barriers,
conduits, or other changes necessary to prevent that risk. The construc-
tion can also take place if it is done under an existing written agreement
or by a regulated utility because of a natural disaster. If these rules are
violated, a constructor is liable for damages that the violation proximately
caused and may be subject to injunctive relief.
EFFECrIVE: September 1, 2005.
10. ACT: Act of May 29, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 267, §§ 1-19, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 612 (Vernon). 180 (HB 2161)
ISSUE: Relating to: the Railroad Commission's power to adopt and en-
force safety standards and practices applicable to transporting certain
substances by pipeline and to certain facilities; the provision of severance
tax credits, exemptions, and other incentives and procedures for produc-
178. Codified as an amendment to TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 102.051(a) (Vernon Supp.
2005).
179. Codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 756.103, ad-
ding §§ 756.104 & 756.105, amending § 756.123, adding §§ 756.124 & 756.125, amending
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ArN. § 117.101(a), adding § 117.102, amending TEX. UTIL. CODE
ANN. § 121.202(b), and adding § 121.2025 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
180. Codified as amendments to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 81.116(d), 81.117(d),
89.044, adding §§ 89.047 & 89.048, amending §§ 91.112(a) & 117.012, amending TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. §§ 201.053 & 201.058(a), adding § 201.059, amending §§ 201.059, 201.102,
202.052(c), adding §§ 202.058, 202.060, 202.061, and amending TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN.
§§ 121.201, 121.206(a) & (d) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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ing oil or gas from certain wells or plugging wells; and the procedure for
computing severance taxes in connection with certain gas sales and im-
posing an administrative penalty.
SUMMARY: A person who is considering assumption of operatorship
and regulatory responsibility for an orphaned well can perform a surface
inspection of the well before assuming that role if the Railroad Commis-
sion allows it. The person must be an operator in good standing and must
deliver written notice to the surface owner of record and to any occupant
at least three days before the inspection.
If, after being designated by the Railroad Commission as the well oper-
ator, the person brings the well back into continuous, active operation or
plugs the well in accordance with Commission rules within three years,
then he may qualify for exemption and payments. These include a non-
transferable exemption from severance taxes for all future production, a
nontransferable exemption from section 81.116 and 81.117 fees for all fu-
ture production, and a payment from the Commission equal to the well's
depth in feet multiplied by fifty cents.
This act also provides that the owner of land containing an orphaned
well may contract with a Commission-approved well plugger to plug the
well. After the landowner gives notice to the operator, the well may be
plugged. The Railroad Commission will reimburse the surface estate
owner no more than half the cost from money in the Oil Field Cleanup
Program Fund.
This act authorizes the Railroad Commission to implement rules after
September 1, 2007, related to preventing pipeline-facility damage that re-
sults from a person moving earth near the facility.
This act also reduces the severance tax otherwise due on gas produced
and saved from a qualifying low-producing well, which is defined as a gas
well that produces no more than ninety McF per day during a 3-month
period. The credit varies depending upon the average taxable gas price
that the comptroller certifies as follows: 100%, less than $2.50 per McF;
50%, from $2.50 to $3.00; and 25%, from $3.00 to $3.50.
Likewise, the act reduces the severance tax otherwise due on a qualify-
ing low-producing oil lease, which is an oil well that is part of a lease that
produces fewer than fifteen barrels of oil per day or five percent recover-
able oil per barrel of produced water. The credit varies according to the
average taxable oil price that the comptroller certifies as follows: 100%,
less than $22.00 per barrel; 50%, from $22.00 to $25.00; and 25%, from
$25.00 to $30.00.
This act clarifies that a gas purchaser's reimbursement payments to a
producer for severance taxes due are not part of the gross cash receipts
upon which tax is computed.
Also, the taxpayer who is responsible for paying severance taxes on the
production from a marginal well can receive a credit if enhanced-effi-
ciency equipment is installed and used. A taxpayer may receive a credit
of ten percent of the equipment's cost as long as certain criteria are met:
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(1) The cumulative authorized severance tax credits may not exceed
$1,000 for any marginal well; (2) the well's enhanced-efficiency equip-
ment must have been purchased and installed after September 1, 2005,
but before September 1, 2009; (3) the taxpayer must file the credit appli-
cation with the comptroller and must demonstrate that the equipment
was purchased and installed within the set period; (4) each state fiscal
year, the comptroller may approve only as many application as equals
one percent of the producing marginal wells as of September 1, as deter-
mined by the comptroller; and (5) the equipment's manufacturer must
obtain an evaluation of the product. This act defines enhanced-efficiency
equipment as equipment that a Texas institution of higher education with
an accredited petroleum-engineering program has approved by determin-
ing that the equipment reduces energy usage. In producing one barrel,
the equipment must reduce the energy used by ten percent or more when
compared to commonly available alternatives. This term does not include
a motor or downhole pump.
EFFECTIVE: Effective September 1, 2005, except §§ 1-8, 11, 12 of this
act, which are effective January 1, 2006.
11. Acr: Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 339, §§ 1-3, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 982 (Vernon). 181 (SB 1130)
ISSUE: Relating to a requirement that a common carrier or pipeline
owner or operator report contamination.
SUMMARY: This act requires a common carrier or pipeline owner or
operator to report any contamination to the Railroad Commission and to
the owner of the land on which the pipeline is located. This includes ob-
serving or detecting any petroleum-based soil or water contamination in
proximity to the pipeline: (a) hydrocarbons present on the water surface;
(b) at least five linear yards of soil affected by hydrocarbons; or (c) soil
affected by hydrocarbons that extends beyond the face of the excavation
where the contamination is detected. The contamination report: (a) must
be made within twenty-four hours of observation or detection; (b) must
include the global-positioning-satellite coordinates of the contaminated
site; and (c) may be made by telephone, facsimile, or e-mail.
This act also requires the Railroad Commission to collect a soil sample
from the contaminated land. The Commission may not use money in the
Oil Field Cleanup Program to implement this section.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2005.
12. ACT: Act of May 16, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 514, §§ 1-4, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1402 (Vernon). 182 (HB 773)
ISSUE: Relating to the Railroad Commission's purchasing functions.
181. Codified as an amendment to subch. C, ch. 81, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN., adding
§ 81.056 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
182. Codified as amendments to TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., adding § 2115.49, amending
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.057, and repealing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.021
(Vernon Supp. 2005).
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SUMMARY: This act delegates to the Railroad Commission all purchas-
ing functions under Chapter 89, sections 91.111 and 91.112 of the Natural
Resources Code relating to abandoned wells and Oil Field Cleanup Pro-
gram management. The Railroad Commission can acquire goods and ser-
vices relating to these activities by any method that provides the best
value to the Commission according to the standards listed in section
2155.074 of the Government Code. At its request, the Railroad Commis-
sion may use the Commission's services to procure goods and services.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2005.
13. ACT: Act of May 29, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 366, §§ 1-4, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1039 (Vernon). 183 (SB 1297)
ISSUE: Relating to the elements of the criminal offense of discharging
used oil into water.
SUMMARY: This act provides an exception from the offense of dis-
charging any waste or pollutant into any water-if the discharge of used
oil results in less than fifteen parts per million and the person discharging
waste is authorized to discharge storm water under a general permit.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 2005.
14. ACT: Act of Apr. 28, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 38, §§ 1-3, 2005
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 55 (Vernon).1 84 (SB 1299)
ISSUE: Relating to an exception to the prohibition against commingling
used oil with solid waste if the commingling is incidental to the disman-
tling of scrap, used, or obsolete metals.
SUMMARY: This act provides an exception to knowingly mixing used
oil with solid waste and disposing of it in landfills either directly or indi-
rectly-when the commingling is incidental to and the unavoidable result
of the dismantling or mechanical shredding of motor vehicles, appliances,
or other items of scrap, used, or obsolete metals.
183. Codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 7.147(a) & 7.176(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2005).
184. Codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.176(a) & (c) (Vernon
Supp. 2005).
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